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I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the 
macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible 
microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a 
microstructure to experience, I use empirical considerations to defend the thesis 
against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with 
other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for 




§ 0 | INTRODUCTION1 
When we think about the structure of the physical world, we distinguish 
the macrophysical realm from the microphysical realm. We take the macrophysical 
properties we perceive with the naked eye (or ear, nose, tongue, etc.) to be realized 
by microphysical properties beyond our perceptual grasp. Putting it another way, 
we take the physical world to have a microstructure. 
Though this picture of the physical world is now familiar, it has not always 
been obvious. For a theorist of antiquity, ascribing a microstructure to the physical 
world would have been a radical and speculative hypothesis. Perception alone 
reveals only the physical world’s macrostructure. To investigate its microstructure, 
we had to develop experimental methods, theoretical frameworks, and technology 
that enable us to discover more than what our bare perceptual capacities reveal. 
Our perceptual capacities put us in contact with physical properties of the 
external world. Our introspective capacities, on the other hand, put us in contact 
with phenomenal properties of our own experiences. But whereas the idea that the 
physical world has a microstructure is now taken for granted, the idea that our 
own experiences might have microstructures is widely dismissed. What would it 
even mean for the phenomenal properties we introspect to be realized by non-
introspectible microphenomenal properties? The following quote from Barry 
Dainton illustrates this skepticism: 
 
                                         
1 I am deeply grateful to David Chalmers for comments and discussion across numerous 
drafts of this paper. I am also thankful for helpful comments and discussions with Ned 
Block, Kyle Blumberg, Philip Goff, Grace Helton, Daniel Hoek, Ben Holguín, Pierre Jacob, 
Uriah Kriegel, Harvey Lederman, Geoffrey Lee, Robert Long, Hedda Hassel-Mørch, Daniel 
Muñoz, Thomas Nagel, Luke Roelofs, Peter Unger, two anonymous referees, and audiences 
at the City University of New York, Institut Jean Nicod, and New York University. 
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[T]here is no reason to think phenomenal objects decompose into anything 
akin to the micro-constituents of ordinary physical objects…The only phenomenal 
parts possessed by a phenomenal object are those that are manifest in the 
experience itself….since phenomenological inquiry is restricted to the level of 
appearances.2 
 
According to philosophical orthodoxy, experiences are not the kinds of 
things that can have microstructures. It is often claimed that there is no 
appearance-reality distinction for experiences, which seems to leave no room for a 
non-introspectible realm of microphenomenal properties. In fact, it is hard to even 
find explicit arguments against the idea of microphenomenal structure, for the 
impossibility of such a view is often taken to be more or less self-evident.3 
The central thesis of this paper is that experiences can have 
microphenomenal structures. To defend this claim, I argue that the following 
hypothesis is philosophically defensible: 
 
MICROSTRUCTURE: Our experiences have microphenomenal structure. 
 
Whether or not MICROSTRUCTURE is true is a largely empirical matter, and 
I will later argue that we do not yet have the tools for empirically evaluating the 
hypothesis. But I believe that the philosophical grounds for dismissing it are weak 
and that the hypothesis deserves serious exploration. Moreover, recognizing 
                                         
2 Dainton [2000]. 
3 Some philosophers have discussed MICROSTRUCTURE in the context of panpsychism (e.g., 
Strawson [2008], Chalmers [2015], and Goff [2017]). Those discussions overlap with some of 
the issues discussed in this paper, but the aims and scope are different. This paper focuses 
on MICROSTRUCTURE as a thesis about the structure of experience, independent of its 
relation to issues about the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, one reason for caring about 
the philosophical defensibility of MICROSTRUCTURE is that it is entailed by certain versions 
of panpsychism. In §3, I explain the points of intersection and independence between 
MICROSTRUCTURE and panpsychism in more detail. 
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MICROSTRUCTURE as a live option has important ramifications for consciousness 
research. Not only does it challenge our conventional assumptions about the 
structure of experience, but it also has implications for issues such as which 
phenomenal properties are fundamental, what the physical correlates of experience 
might be, the science of consciousness, and the limits of introspection.  
In §1, I characterize what it would mean for our experiences to have 
microphenomenal structures. In §2, I address the principal challenge for 
MICROSTRUCTURE: namely, the claim that subjects can know the phenomenal 
realizers of the experiences they introspect. In §3, I discuss specific versions of 
MICROSTRUCTURE and how the thesis relates to other issues about experience. In 
§4, I consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm. 
 
§ 1 | MICROSTRUCTURE 
What is it for a domain to have a microstructure? In brief: the observable 
macroproperties of the domain are realized by unobservable microproperties of that 
domain. It is easy to see how our default picture of the physical world satisfies this 
criterion: the macrophysical properties of tables, chairs, and watermelons are 
realized by microphysical properties of molecules, atoms, and particles. This section 
articulates what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experiences. 
 
MICROPHENOMENAL PROPERTIES 
A phenomenal property is a property that characterizes4 the phenomenal 
character of an experience.5 In other words, phenomenal properties are the 
subjective, qualitative properties that characterize what it is like to have that 
experience. If our experiences have microphenomenal structure, then the 
macrophenomenal properties we introspect (such as the properties characterizing 
                                         
4 Note that characterization is a different relation than constitution. For example, a 
physicalist might think that the molecular properties of a subject’s brain constitute (but 
do not characterize) a subject’s experiences. See Goff [2017] for discussion of this distinction. 
5 I will be neutral between understanding properties as universals versus as particulars. 
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color experiences, pains, and so forth) are realized by non-introspectible 
microphenomenal properties. 
What is it for a property to be microphenomenal? To answer this question, 
it is useful to first think about what it is for a property to be microphysical. The 
obvious criterion is that microphysical properties are unobservable via our basic 
perceptual capacities. But while this condition is necessary, it is not sufficient. 
There are many physical properties, such as some of those of large electromagnetic 
fields or of physical objects outside of our light cone, that are imperceptible but 
need not be microphysical. The other criterion needed is that microphysical 
properties also realize the macrophysical properties we perceive. By analogy, 
microphenomenal properties are non-introspectible phenomenal properties that 
realize the macrophenomenal properties we introspect. 
Some might argue that a third criterion on microproperties is that they are 
properties of small entities. After all, the canonical examples of microphysical 
properties are properties of particles, atoms, and molecules. However, there are two 
reasons that favor leaving out size constraints in the characterization of 
microproperties. First, large entities also have microproperties. For example, the 
property that characterizes the precise atomic configuration of the Earth at this 
moment is a microphysical property of the Earth. Second, it is unclear how to 
apply the notion of size to experiences. The sense in which my visual experience of 
a particular object is “smaller” than my total visual experience is arguably distinct 
from the notion of size we apply to physical objects. For these reasons, I believe it 
is best to leave out size requirements in the characterization of microproperties. 
 
INTROSPECTION 
We can take introspection to be the first-person knowledge acquisition 
process by which we form judgments about our own experiences.6 This 
                                         
6 For those skeptical that there is any single proprietary process by which we form 
judgments about our own experiences, we can instead talk about whatever set of processes 
‘introspection’ denotes. 
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characterization is largely neutral, leaving open a range of views about the nature 
and mechanisms of introspection. For our purposes, it also does not matter much 
whether we take the objects of introspection to be experiences, phenomenal 
properties, or phenomenal facts. And while I sometimes draw analogies between 
introspection and perception, that should not be taken to suggest that introspection 
is a kind of inner perception. More generally, my claims are consistent with holding 
that there are important epistemic asymmetries between perception and 
introspection. For example, even if one accepts that our experiences have 
microphenomenal realizers, one could still think that introspection is immune to 
certain kinds of error that perception is susceptible to (such as illusions and 
hallucinations). 
Whereas introspection is a type of knowledge acquisition process, 
introspectibility is a matter of being able to acquire that knowledge on the basis of 
introspection. Some have been tempted to think that properties that characterize 
what it is like to have an experience are coextensive with properties that are 
introspectible. But that is a substantive theoretical commitment, since 
introspectibility and phenomenality are specified by different theoretical roles. In 
particular, a property is phenomenal just in case it characterizes what it is like to 
have an experience, while a property is introspectible by a subject just in case that 
subject can know when that phenomenal property is instantiated. In §2, I discuss 
some cases showing how phenomenal character comes apart from introspectibility. 
Now we are in a better position to understand what demarcates the micro-
macro boundary. In the case of the physical world, the boundary between the 
microphysical and macrophysical is fixed by the actual perceptual capacities of 
normal humans. In the case of experience, the boundary between the 
microphenomenal and macrophenomenal is fixed by the actual introspective 
capacities of normal humans. In both cases, the micro-macro distinction tracks the 
kinds of properties that normal humans are actually sensitive to. And in both cases, 
it is plausible that the boundary is vague and does not pick out a joint in nature. 
In fact, in §2, I discuss some examples of phenomenal properties that may lie in 
the borderline region between microphenomenal and macrophenomenal. 
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All this is consistent with the possibility that microphenomenal properties 
are introspectible in principle. Even though microphysical properties are 
imperceptible, we can imagine creatures (or enhanced humans) with perceptual 
capacities that enable the perception of microphysical properties. In §4, I discuss 
the analogous possibility of creatures (or enhanced humans) with introspective 
capacities that enable the introspection of microphenomenal properties. 
 
APPEARANCE AND REALITY 
If there is no appearance-reality distinction for experiences, then there is a 
puzzle about how to make sense of microphenomenal properties. In the case of the 
physical world, it is natural to think of microphysical properties as not appearing 
to us at all. But if we are interested in appearances themselves, then it does not 
make sense to talk about appearance properties that do not appear to us at all. 
Yet that seems to be what microphenomenal properties must be. How do we solve 
this puzzle? 
The puzzle equivocates on the term ‘appearance’. On the one hand, we 
could understand ‘appearance’ in a phenomenal sense, where appearances are a 
matter of phenomenal character. Under this interpretation, it does not make sense 
to talk about phenomenal properties that do not appear in any way to their subject. 
But MICROSTRUCTURE does not entail an appearance-reality distinction in this 
sense, since microphenomenal properties characterize the phenomenal character of 
a subject’s experience. On the other hand, we could understand ‘appearance’ in an 
epistemic sense, where appearances are a matter of the judgments a subject is 
inclined to make. MICROSTRUCTURE entails an appearance-reality distinction in 
this sense, since a subject’s having a certain experience does not guarantee that the 
subject makes the right judgments about that experience. But there is no 
contradiction here, since it is false that there is no appearance-reality distinction 
for experiences in this sense. The puzzle about appearances is deflated once we 
distinguish these two different senses of ‘appearance’. 
At the same time, the puzzle points to one of the disanalogies between 
microphenomenal properties and microphysical properties. Whereas microphysical 
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properties do not make a difference to our experiences at all (in that they do not 
figure into the contents of our experiences), microphenomenal properties do make 
a difference to our experiences (in that they partially characterize the phenomenal 
character of our experiences). Nevertheless, microphenomenal properties can still 
satisfy the theoretical role associated with microscopic properties discussed 
previously: namely, being non-introspectible phenomenal properties that realize the 
macrophenomenal properties we introspect. 
  
AN ANALOGY 
Some might still find it hard to understand how non-introspectible 
phenomenal properties could contribute to the phenomenal character of experience. 
Perhaps an analogy might help: Think about a series of photographic layers 
superimposed on top of each other that collectively form an image. Each layer makes 
its own individual contribution to the character of the image—some layers add a 
certain texture, some add a certain shade of color, and so on. Since the layers are 
stacked on top of each other, they are seamlessly blended together. When we 
perceptually observe the image, we do not discern the individual layers; rather, we 
see a unified image. Nevertheless, each layer contributes to how the image appears 
to us. If a layer were removed, our perceptual experience would change.7 
Analogously, microphenomenal properties might each make their own individual 
contribution to the overall phenomenal character of our experience, even though we 
may be unable to introspectively individuate microphenomenal properties when they 
are combined with other microphenomenal properties. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVATIONS 
 Is there positive reason for endorsing MICROSTRUCTURE? I mentioned that 
MICROSTRUCTURE is an empirical thesis that we are not yet in a position to assess. 
                                         
7 Similar examples would also work with other kinds of sensory modalities. Consider, for 
example, a sound sample with multiple layers, a culinary dish with a variety of subtle 
flavors, or a perfume containing a complex blend of scents. 
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At the same time, there may be some philosophical motivations for 
MICROSTRUCTURE. In what follows, I briefly mention some of these motivations. 
However, since my main goal is to show that MICROSTRUCTURE is coherent and 
philosophically defensible, I will not discuss these motivations in detail. 
 First, MICROSTRUCTURE renders certain views about the mind-body problem 
more plausible. Most notably, MICROSTRUCTURE is entailed by constitutive 
panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities have microexperiences that 
constitute the macroexperiences of macrosubjects. I discuss the relationship between 
MICROSTRUCTURE and panpsychism in more detail in §3. More generally, 
MICROSTRUCTURE strengthens any view about the mind-body problem that takes 
phenomenal properties to correspond to relatively low-level physical properties. 
 On a related note, MICROSTRUCTURE may help solve the grain problem, or 
the problem of explaining the mismatch between the structure of our experiences (as 
revealed by introspection) and the structure of the physical correlates of experience. 
For example, our experiences seem to sometimes have continuous structures while 
the physical correlates of experience seem to have discrete structures. This 
discrepancy in structure is puzzling, especially for theories that entail that the 
structure of an experience cannot outstrip the structure of its physical correlates. 
But if MICROSTRUCTURE is true, then our experiences might turn out to have 
discrete structures at the microphenomenal level, even if introspection leads us to 
believe that our experiences have continuous structures.8 
 MICROSTRUCTURE also has implications for phenomenal similarity. When 
two experiences are phenomenally similar, they must be similar in virtue of sharing 
some phenomenal properties. But there are cases where we have reason to think that 
two experiences are similar even though they do not seem to share any 
macrophenomenal properties. For example, one class of such examples is crossmodal 
correspondences, or associations between seemingly unrelated basic sensory features 
across different sensory modalities (e.g., bright objects and high pitches). A natural 
                                         
8 There are different formulations of the grain problem, each of which generates somewhat 
different issues. See Lockwood [1993] for a classic discussion of the problem. 
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hypothesis is that crossmodally paired experiences are phenomenally similar.9 But 
this hypothesis is tenable only if MICROSTRUCTURE is true, since crossmodally paired 
experiences seem to have no macrophenomenal properties in common. 
 Perhaps the most intriguing philosophical motivation for MICROSTRUCTURE 
is that it opens up the possibility for SMALL-PALETTE, the thesis that there is a small 
number of fundamental phenomenal properties. I discuss the relationship 
MICROSTRUCTURE and SMALL-PALETTE in more detail in §3. 
 
§ 2 | STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY 
Philosophers have largely been skeptical of MICROSTRUCTURE, often 
assuming that experiences cannot have microstructures. The principal basis for this 
skepticism is epistemological. While it is common knowledge that the way the 
physical world really is need not be the same as the way it appears, it may be 
puzzling how to draw such a distinction for experiences. The following quote from 
Philip Goff illustrates the sentiment behind this skepticism: 
 
Surely, you know exactly what your pain is—what it is for someone 
to feel pained in precisely that way—just by attending to pain and 
thinking about [it] in terms of how it feels. There is nothing in any way 
hidden from you about the reality of how you’re feeling…And that’s 
because the feeling is “right there” for you.10 
 
Is there a principle that can provide the basis for an epistemological 
challenge against MICROSTRUCTURE? At first pass, the challenge seems to be 
motivated by LUMINOSITY, the thesis that if a subject has an experience, then that 
                                         
9 See Marks [1987] for a well-known experimental study on audio-visual correspondences, 
Spence [2011] for a general overview of crossmodal correspondences, and Parise [2016] for 
a discussion of experimental paradigms and current issues. Notably, some researchers (such 
as Marks [1987]) have used the term “crossmodal similarities” to denote the phenomenon. 
10 Philip Goff, Consciousness and Fundamental Reality [2017] 
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subject is in a position to know all phenomenal facts about that experience.11 
However, LUMINOSITY has been challenged on a variety of grounds. For example, 
Block [1995, 2011] argues that there are limits to our cognitive access to our 
experiences, Williamson [2001] argues that there are no phenomenal states such 
that whenever one is in that state, one is always in a position to know one is in 
that state, and Schwitzgebel [2008] argues that ordinary introspection is unreliable. 
These and other considerations have rendered LUMINOSITY a controversial thesis 
that many contemporary philosophers reject. 
Since MICROSTRUCTURE has been widely dismissed, LUMINOSITY is too 
controversial to capture the challenge to MICROSTRUCTURE. Instead, we need a 
more targeted thesis: 
 
STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY: If a subject introspects an experience, then that subject 
is in a position to know the phenomenal realizers of that experience. 
 
 To know the phenomenal realizers of an experience is to know which 
experiences realize that experience.12 For example, my total perceptual experience 
is realized by my visual experience, auditory experience, and so forth. According 
to STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY, introspecting my total perceptual experience puts me 
in a position to know that it is realized by my different sensory experiences. And 
if an experience has no phenomenal realizers, then it is natural to take STRUCTURE 
LUMINOSITY to entail that we are in a position to know that. 
STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY is more modest than LUMINOSITY. It is restricted 
to facts about which experiences realize other experiences, rather than ranging over 
all phenomenal facts. And it is restricted to experiences that subjects introspect, 
                                         
11 LUMINOSITY is sometimes cast as SELF-INTIMATION. The formulation of LUMINOSITY 
stated here differs slightly from the canonical formulation from Williamson [2000], though 
the differences do not matter for the purposes of this paper. 
12 The characterization could also be put in terms of properties, where to know the 
phenomenal realizers of phenomenal property is to know which phenomenal properties 
realize that phenomenal property. 
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rather than ranging over all experiences. These qualifications enable us to set aside 
traditional objections to LUMINOSITY, which largely concern non-ideal conditions 
for introspection, such as introspection of experiences outside the focus of one’s 
attention, or in the periphery of one’s visual field, or in comparison to extremely 
similar experiences. Since STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY is immune to some of the 
traditional objections against LUMINOSITY, it is a more defensible thesis. 
At the same time, STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY precisely targets the most 
counterintuitive consequence of MICROSTRUCTURE: namely, that even in the best 
conditions for introspection, our experiences can have more structure than what 
we can introspect. Here is the basic argument: 
 
[P1] If a subject introspects an experience, then that subject is in a position 
to know the phenomenal realizers of that experience. 
[P2] If MICROSTRUCTURE is true, then our experiences have 
microphenomenal realizers. 
[P3] Introspecting our experiences does not put us in a position to know 
that our experiences have microphenomenal realizers. 
————— 
[C] MICROSTRUCTURE is false. 
 
The first premise is STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY. The second premise follows from the 
definition of MICROSTRUCTURE. And the third premise is justified by basic 
introspection and the definition of microphenomenal realizers. I believe this 
argument captures the principal challenge to MICROSTRUCTURE. 
However, the argument is unsound because STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY is 
false. The best way to see why it is false is by appeal to some empirical 
considerations. In what follows, I present three cases against STRUCTURE 
LUMINOSITY.13 
                                         
13 See Roelofs [2014] for discussion of some of these same cases in a different (though 
related) context: namely, in regard to the palette problem for Russellian monism. 
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1. PAIN ASYMBOLIA 
Do you know how your pain experiences are structured? Most people, when 
introspecting their pains, are inclined to think that pain is a simple phenomenal 
property. But pain asymbolia, a condition caused by damage to the posterior insula 
of the brain’s cortex [Grahek 2007], indicates otherwise. Pain asymbolics report 
experiencing pain sensations without feeling motivated to stop those sensations. 
For example, if a pain asymbolic’s hand is placed in a bucket of ice water or on a 
hot stove, they will report experiencing the same pain sensations they felt prior to 
their brain damage, but without the unpleasantness. Similar reports occur with 
patients on morphine. 
The standard explanation of these phenomena is that pain experience has 
two separable components: a sensory component (corresponding to the pain 
sensation) and an affective component (corresponding to the unpleasantness). This 
view takes the reports of pain asymbolics at face value, and has been defended by 
both philosophers and scientists.14 The idea is that the pain experiences of pain 
asymbolics retain the sensory component while lacking the affective component. 
Because of this, they do not feel the immediate motivation to withdraw from 
painful stimuli, even though stimulation of their nociceptors still causes them to 
feel sensations. Figure 1 illustrates this structured model of the structure of pain 
experience: 
                                         
14 See Grahek [2007] for a comprehensive scientific and clinical discussion of pain asymbolia. 
See Kupers et al [1991] for evidence of similar reports from morphine patients. For defenses 
of the structured model of pain experience, see Dennett [1978], Hardcastle [1997], Price 
[2000], and Grahek [2007]. For a recent criticism of this interpretation, see Klein [2015]. 
Note that in order for one to defend structure luminosity, one must not only establish that 
the structured model is false, but also that we were in a position to know it is false solely 





If STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY is true, then subjects are in a position to know 
the phenomenal realizers of their pain experiences. But even though pain 
experiences are both salient and ubiquitous, we did not learn about their structure 
until evaluating the evidence from pain asymbolics.15 As Grahek [2007] puts it, 
even though “pain appears to be simple, homogenous experience,” its components 
“can become disconnected and therefore, much to our astonishment, they can exist 
separately.” Consequently, STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY is false. 
 
2. PIXEL MOSAIC 
Take a look at the pixel mosaic below: 
 
                                         
15 The structured model of pain experience is corroborated by another case involving a 
patient with a post-central lesion, where stimulation of the patient’s hand caused him to 
report experiencing a sensation that was not painful but was “clearly unpleasant” and which 
he “wanted to avoid”. The researchers investigating this patient have argued that this is a 
case where the affective component of pain experience was present in the absence of the 
sensory component. Taken along with pain asymbolia, this is evidence of a double 
dissociation between the two components of pain. See Ploner, Freund, and Schnitzler [1999] 





FIGURE 1: The structured 




Consider your visual experience as you stare at the center of the pixel 
mosaic. Your overall visual experience of the pixel mosaic is realized by numerous 
local visual experiences corresponding to different parts of the pixel mosaic. But it 
is unlikely that introspecting your visual experience will put you in a position to 
identify those phenomenal realizers. Even if you are able to know some 
determinable facts about those phenomenal realizers, such as the fact that they 
each represent arrays of pixels, you are unlikely to be able to identify precisely 
which local visual experiences realize your overall visual experience. Hence, you are 
not in a position to know the phenomenal realizers of your overall visual experience 
of the pixel mosaic. 
Some might argue that you are in a position to identify each individual 
phenomenal realizer, even if you are not in a position to know the total collection 
that realizes your overall visual experience. But even such piecemeal knowledge is 
arguably unattainable. Can you tell what color your visual experience represents 
the pixel at the leftmost part of the mosaic, whether each individual phenomenal 
realizer is stable over time or slightly changing in character as your attention shifts, 
or even what the most basic phenomenal realizers are in this case? Speaking for 
myself, no matter how hard I try to introspect, I do not know the answers to these 
questions. Even if you have excellent introspective abilities, you are unlikely to be 
able to distinguish the maximally determinate phenomenal properties 
characterizing your current experiences from the other nearby maximally 
determinate phenomenal properties that represent different configurations of pixels. 
 
FIGURE 2: A pixel mosaic. 
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The upshot is that you are not in a position to know the phenomenal realizers of 
your visual experience of the pixel mosaic. Consequently, STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY 
is false. 
 
3. FLAVOR EXPERIENCE 
When you have a flavor experience, are you in a position to identify its 
gustatory and olfactory realizers? Consider, for example, the flavor experiences 
induced by “ripe mangoes, fresh figs, lemon, canteloupe melon, raspberries … green 
olives, ripe persimmon, onion, caraway, parsnip, peppermint, aniseed, cinnamon, 
fresh salmon.”16 Even careful introspection does not reveal what the phenomenal 
realizers of those experiences are. In fact, oftentimes flavor experiences might seem 
simple and unstructured. This point is well articulated by Smith [2013] when he 
says that even though flavor perception is multimodal, flavor experiences “can 
strike us as whole, unified percepts,” and “on the basis of that phenomenology, we 






Some might contend that flavor experiences really are simple. But there is 
compelling reason to think that flavor experiences are at least partially realized by 
gustatory and olfactory experiences. The science of flavor perception indicates that 
flavor perception involves a combination of olfactory and gustatory perception, and 
                                         
16 See Sibley [2006] for even more examples of flavors. 
FIGURE 3: Flavor experiences are realized by 
olfactory and gustatory experiences. 
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perhaps involve somatosensory and hedonic experiences as well. In particular, 
differences in gustatory and olfactory perception systematically track differences in 
flavor experience.17 Even setting aside the science, it is easy to grasp how flavor 
experiences are structured with a bit of experimental phenomenology: pinch your 
nose while eating a food, and you will experience the aspects of flavor experience 
that are lost when the contribution from olfaction is removed. 
 Some might object that sometimes we can identify the phenomenal realizers 
of our flavor experiences. For example, a wine connoisseur can arguably 
discriminate a rich range of components within their wine experiences. But few 
subjects can do this with any degree of reliability, and it is plausible that nobody 
can identify every basic gustatory and olfactory realizer. Even amongst experts, 
the most careful introspection of one’s flavor experience does not put one in a 
position to know, in precise and complete detail, that experience’s gustatory and 
olfactory realizers. The upshot is the same as in the other cases: STRUCTURE 
LUMINOSITY is false. 
 
OBJECTIONS 
I have argued against STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY, and in doing so I have 
defended MICROSTRUCTURE.18 How might an opponent object to my arguments? 
A first objection is that the cases above do not exhibit genuine examples of 
microphenomenal realizers. However, this objection misconstrues the dialectic. The 
purpose of the cases is to show that STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY is false. By 
consequence, the principal challenge to MICROSTRUCTURE is unsound. The question 
of whether the phenomenal realizers discussed above are microphenomenal is 
                                         
17 See Auvray & Spence [2008] and Spence & Smith [2013] for overviews of the science of 
flavor perception, including some discussion of the implications for flavor phenomenology. 
18 These examples also illustrate how non-introspectible phenomenal properties could still 
contribute to the overall phenomenology of an experience. For example, our pain 
experiences would be quite different in phenomenal character if they were to lack their 
affective quality. 
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independent of that dialectical point. On that question, though, I am inclined to 
think that the cases I have discussed lie within the borderline region between 
microphenomenal and macrophenomenal. 
 A second objection is that subjects do know the realizers of the phenomenal 
properties they introspect, only under the guise of different concepts. For example, 
in the case PAIN ASYMBOLIA, one might think that subjects do know that ordinary 
pain experiences have a sensory and an affective component, even if they do not 
have concepts that pick out those specific components. However, if this response is 
tenable, it becomes unclear why STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY is inconsistent with 
MICROSTRUCTURE in the first place. The microtheorist could argue that subjects 
do know the microphenomenal realizers of their microphenomenal properties, only 
under the guise of different concepts. 
A third objection is that subjects are in a position to know the realizers of 
their experiences, even if they cannot actually acquire such knowledge. For 
example, in the case of PIXEL MOSAIC, one might argue that you are in a position 
to know which maximally determinate phenomenal property characterizes your 
visual experience, even if your introspective capacities do not enable you to actually 
acquire that knowledge. However, in my original formulation of microphenomenal 
properties, non-introspectibility concerns the actual introspective capacities of 
normal humans. If STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY abstracts away from those limitations, 
then one could accept subjects are in a position to know the microphenomenal 
realizers of their experiences while also holding that their introspective capacities 
do not enable them to actually acquire such knowledge.  As before, this move 
deflates the force of the challenge by rendering STRUCTURE LUMINOSITY consistent 
with MICROSTRUCTURE. 
A last objection is that these cases do not involve genuine phenomenal 
realizers. For example, one might argue that in the case of FLAVOR EXPERIENCE, 
the gustatory and olfactory components are not realizers of flavor experiences, but 
instead aspects of flavor experiences. The difference is a matter of fundamentality; 
realizers are grounders, whereas aspects are grounded. However, this objection 
employs a more theoretically demanding notion of 'realizer than the one that I had 
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in mind. Remember that MICROSTRUCTURE is consistent with both atomism and 
holism about experience, meaning that the thesis builds in no claims about the 
direction of fundamentality. On the relevant understanding of ‘realizer,’ the claim 
that flavor experiences have gustatory and olfactory phenomenal realizers is 
consistent with the latter being aspects of the former. Consequently, someone who 
thinks that experiences have microphenomenal aspects is still committed to a 
version of MICROSTRUCTURE. 
 
§ 3 | MICROTHEORIES 
A microtheory is a specific version of MICROSTRUCTURE. This section 
examines five dimensions along which we can distinguish microtheories. Seeing how 
MICROSTRUCTURE relates to other issues about experience will also clarify what is 
built into MICROSTRUCTURE itself. 
 
SCOPE 
Which classes of macrophenomenal properties have microphenomenal 
realizers? According to global microtheories, all macrophenomenal properties have 
microphenomenal realizers. These are the most ambitious versions of 
MICROSTRUCTURE. But we could also consider local microtheories according to 
which particular categories of macrophenomenal properties have microphenomenal 
realizers. For example, we could consider whether color experiences or auditory 
experiences or emotional experiences have microstructures, independently of 
whether a global thesis is true. And some might think that there are reasons for 
ascribing microphenomenal structure to some categories of experience but not 
others. In the middle are semi-global microtheories, which take all but a privileged 
set of macrophenomenal properties to have microphenomenal realizers. For 
example, some might think that the phenomenal properties characterizing the unity 
of experience and the subjective character of experience cannot have 
microphenomenal realizers, even though other kinds of macrophenomenal 
properties can. 
 20 
It is plausible that empirical investigation of MICROSTRUCTURE would 
proceed by way of piecemeal investigation into particular domains of experience. If 
there is reason to think that a wide range of local domains of experience have 
microphenomenal structures, then that may pave the way towards a global 
microtheory. In contrast, this paper has principally been focused on global 
microtheories since my principal aim is to argue that ascribing microphenomenal 
structures to experiences is philosophically defensible. In other words, I have 
focused on broad considerations concerning experience in general, rather than 
specific considerations concerning local domains of experience. 
 
MIND-BODY PROBLEM 
What is the metaphysical nature of experience? Whether one is a 
physicalist, dualist, idealist, or dual-aspect monist, one could be a microtheorist. 
For the most part, issues about the metaphysical nature of experience crosscut 
issues about the structure of experience. Some might wonder whether physicalism 
entails that experiences have microstructures, since physicalists think that 
experiences are ultimately realized by microphysical properties. But 
MICROSTRUCTURE is a thesis about the phenomenal structure of experience, not 
its structure simpliciter. While a physicalist takes experiences to have more 
structure than what we can introspect, they might still think that there are only 
macrophenomenal properties. 
 What about panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities have 
phenomenal properties?19 It is common for panpsychists to talk about 
microphenomenal properties. But neither thesis entails the other. First, one could 
be a panpsychist macrotheorist. For example, one might hold that the 
microexperiences of fundamental entities stand in a causal, rather than a 
constitutive, relation to the macroexperiences of human subjects, and that human 
experiences have only macrophenomenal structure. Or, one might hold that the 
                                         
19 See Strawson [2006], Chalmers [2015, 2016], and Goff [2017] for some recent discussions 
of panpsychism. 
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fundamental physical entity is the entire universe, that human experiences are 
aspects of the universe’s cosmic experience, and that human experiences have only 
macrophenomenal structure. Conversely, one could be an anti-panpsychist 
microtheorist. For example, one might think that only complex organisms are 
conscious, but that human experiences have microphenomenal structure.20 The 
independence of MICROSTRUCTURE and panpsychism is also highlighted by the 
next subsection concerning subjects. 
 
SUBJECTS 
If there are microphenomenal properties, must there be microsubjects? 
MICROSTRUCTURE is a thesis about the structure of our own experiences, rather 
than a thesis about the existence of other subjects. Just as positing visual 
phenomenal properties does not commit us to visual subjects, positing 
microphenomenal properties does not commit us microsubjects. Consider how you 
are currently undergoing a total perceptual experience, which is realized by my 
visual experience, auditory experience, and so forth. If MICROSTRUCTURE is true, 
then your experiences also have further microphenomenal realizers. But this does 
not entail anything about the existence of further subjects.  
Some philosophers have argued that phenomenal properties should be 
understood as properties of subjects, rather than properties of experiences.21 Those 
who favor this framework might find it odd to take microphenomenal properties to 
be properties of human subjects. But remember that humans have microphysical 
                                         
20 While MICROSTRUCTURE and panpsychism are independent, MICROSTRUCTURE is entailed 
by the most popular version of panpsychism: namely, constitutive micropsychism. According 
to this view, the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by microphenomenal 
properties of microphysical entities. By defending MICROSTRUCTURE, this paper has indirectly 
defended constitutive micropsychism: if constitutive micropsychism is false, it is not because 
it is untenable to ascribe microphenomenal structure to experience. 
21 See Byrne [2009] and Nida-Rümelin [forthcoming] for arguments for this framework. In 
my view, this framework is best thought of as a version of phenomenal holism, which I 
discuss below. 
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properties. For example, the property specifying my exact atomic configuration at 
this moment is a property of me. Under this framework, microphenomenal 
properties would characterize extremely fine-grained features of subjects, just as 
the microphysical properties of humans characterize extremely fine-grained features 
of humans. None of this means that MICROSTRUCTURE is inconsistent with thinking 
that there are microsubjects. But the reasons for thinking so would be on grounds 
independent from MICROSTRUCTURE itself. 
Some of the confusion may come from failing to distinguish two different 
characterizations of microphenomenal properties. Sometimes, the term 
‘microphenomenal property’ is used to denote phenomenal properties of 
microphysical entities.22 In contrast, I take ‘microphenomenal property’ to denote 
non-introspectible phenomenal properties that realize the macrophenomenal 
properties we introspect. These characterizations are doubly dissociable, for the 
reasons mentioned above in the discussion of panpsychism. But I believe that my 
characterization of microphenomenal properties better parallels how we think 
about microphysical properties, for the reasons discussed in §1. 
 
FUNDAMENTALITY 
There are two questions about fundamentality that are worth examining in 
conjunction. First, are total experiences grounded in experiential parts? Second, 
are macrophenomenal properties grounded in microphenomenal properties? 
The first issue concerns fundamentality with respect to mereology of 
experiences. According to atomism, experiential parts are grounded in total 
experiences. Under this view, the fundamental phenomenal properties are 
properties of experiential parts. This would be analogous to the position of an 
atomist about the physical world that takes the fundamental physical properties 
                                         
22 This characterization of ‘microphenomenal property’ has been used in some discussions 
of panpsychism (e.g., Chalmers 2015). I suspect that confusing these two senses of 
‘microphenomenal property’ may sometimes obscure the independence between 
panpsychism and MICROSTRUCTURE, as discussed in the previous subsection. 
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to be properties of particles. In contrast, according to holism, experiential parts are 
grounded in total experiences. Under this view, the fundamental phenomenal 
properties are properties of total experiences. This would be analogous to the 
position of a holist about the physical world that takes the fundamental physical 
properties to be properties of the entire universe. Both of these views are consistent 
with taking experiences to have microphenomenal structure, just as atomism and 
holism about the physical world are both consistent with taking the physical world 
to have microphysical structure.23 
The second issue concerns fundamentality with respect to granularity of 
phenomenal properties. This issue concerns the granularity of the phenomenal 
primitives, or the phenomenal properties not grounded in other phenomenal 
properties. According to microprimitivism, the phenomenal primitives are 
microphenomenal properties. Microprimitivism is probably the default view and is 
likely what most have in mind when thinking about MICROSTRUCTURE. But 
MICROSTRUCTURE is also consistent with macroprimitivism, the view that the 
phenomenal primitives are macrophenomenal properties. To get a grip on how 
macrophenomenal properties could ground microphenomenal properties, think 
about the relationship between color versus hue, saturation, and brightness. Some 
think that color phenomenal properties are more fundamental than hue, saturation, 
and brightness phenomenal properties, and that the latter are abstractions from 
the former. Similarly, a macroprimitivist microtheorist thinks that 
macrophenomenal properties ground microphenomenal properties because the 
latter are abstractions from the former. Consequently, ascribing microphenomenal 
properties to experience does not entail that the phenomenal primitives are 
microphenomenal. 
These two dimensions of fundamentality are independent. For example, an 
atomist could be a macroprimitivist. Under this view, the fundamental phenomenal 
properties are macrophenomenal properties of experiential parts. Conversely, a 
                                         
23 For a discussion of holism about the physical world, see Schaffer [2010]. For a discussion 
of atomism versus holism about experiences, see Lee [2014]. 
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holist could be a microprimitivist. Under this view, the fundamental phenomenal 
properties are microphenomenal properties of total experiences. Once we recognize 
those two views are possible, it is easy to see that atomist microprimitivism and 
holist macroprimitivism are possible positions as well. And any of these views is 
consistent with MICROSTRUCTURE, for the reasons discussed above. To put it 
succinctly, MICROSTRUCTURE is a thesis about how much structure experiences 
have, which leaves open questions about which features of experience are 
fundamental. By disentangling these issues, we get a more precise understanding 
of what is built into MICROSTRUCTURE and a more fine-grained taxonomy of 
different views about the structure of experience. 
 
PALETTE 
How big is the base of phenomenal primitives? The most common view is 
LARGE-PALETTE, according to which there is a large number of phenomenal 
primitives. LARGE-PALETTE is popular because it is often presumed to be the only 
game in town. If experiences have only macrophenomenal properties, then it is hard 
to avoid the conclusion that there is a very large number of phenomenal primitives. 
After all, it is implausible that all phenomenal properties could be grounded in a 
privileged set of macrophenomenal properties. McGinn [2006] captures this 
sentiment when he says that “you cannot get pains from from experiences of 
colours, or emotions from thoughts, or thoughts from acts of will.” Because of this, 
the phenomenal primitives are often presumed to be maximally determinate 
macrophenomenal properties, such as the phenomenal properties characterizing 
specific color experiences, specific pain experiences, specific olfactory experiences, 
and so forth. Following this way of identifying the phenomenal primitives, the 
number of phenomenal primitives quickly multiplies. 
However, MICROSTRUCTURE opens up the possibility for SMALL-PALETTE, 
the view that there is a small number of phenomenal primitives. If SMALL-PALETTE 
is true, then the rich variety of macrophenomenal properties we introspect are 
generated by a sparse set of fundamental phenomenal properties. To put it another 
way, SMALL-PALETTE is the thesis that all experiences are made of the same basic 
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phenomenal ingredients. Macrophenomenal properties do not stand in the right 
grounding relations to each other to make SMALL-PALETTE viable, but perhaps 
they could all be grounded in microphenomenal properties.24 
Some might contend that SMALL-PALETTE is dubious even if we accept 
MICROSTRUCTURE. On the face of it, our experiences are too diverse and variegated 
to all be made of the same basic phenomenal ingredients. But consider how 
theorists of antiquity might have been likewise dubious of small-palette theses 
about the physical world. Such theorists might even have thought that there were 
principled philosophical reasons for ruling out such a hypothesis: they might have 
argued that solids can generate only more solids and that liquids can generate only 
more liquids, or that intangible substances like wind cannot be made from the same 
things as material substances like earth. In hindsight, it is obvious that these 
arguments would are unsound. But our current epistemic perspective on the 
physical world obscures how unobvious this once was. Our inquiry into experience 
remains in early stages, and our epistemic perspective on experience may be closer 
to that of theorists of antiquity speculating about the physical world than that of 
contemporary scientists building upon well-developed scientific foundations. 
Because of this, I believe we ought to be epistemically humble about the prospects 
for SMALL-PALETTE if experiences do have microphenomenal structure.25 
 
                                         
24 It is even possible to accept MICROSTRUCTURE while holding that there are no 
phenomenal primitives. For example, one might think that experience is gunky, and that 
every phenomenal property is grounded in more fundamental phenomenal properties. 
25 Of course, there are many views where the physical primitives include physical properties 
that are not obviously microphysical, such as properties of spacetime. And there are some 
views where it is not clear whether are any microphysical primitives, such as views where 
the fundamental physical properties are properties of the quantum state of the universe. I 
will set aside these views here. In a more detailed discussion, we could also consider 
analogous views concerning experience, such as views where the phenomenal primitives 
include spatial and temporal phenomenal properties. 
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§ 4 | INVESTIGATING THE MICROPHENOMENAL REALM 
Suppose that our experiences do have microstructures. What are our 
prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm? This section considers two 
key questions about this issue. First, what are the methodological challenges in 
discovering microphenomenal properties? Second, what are our cognitive 
limitations in forming microphenomenal concepts? 
 
METHODS 
The methodological challenges concerning investigation of 
microphenomenal properties stem from two main sources. First, there are problems 
that arise from microphenomenal properties being phenomenal. Second, there are 
problems that arise from microphenomenal properties being microscopic. I’ll 
discuss each of these briefly, and then problems for the investigation of 
microphenomenal properties more generally. 
The principal challenge for investigating phenomenal properties is that 
attaining knowledge of phenomenal properties requires first-person (in addition to 
third-person) methods. Even if we collect all of the relevant third-person data, we 
still would not gain knowledge of phenomenal properties unless we also integrated 
the third-person data with first-person data. But collecting reliable first-person 
data is difficult—it is often unclear both what the best methods are for producing 
data and how to best interpret the data that is collected. 
The principal challenge for investigating microscopic properties is that 
attaining knowledge of microscopic properties requires tools that transcend our 
basic observational capacities. When we investigate the microphysical realm, we 
cannot rely merely on our basic perceptual capacities. To investigate the 
microstructure of the physical world, we have had to develop experimental methods 
and technology designed to be sensitive to microphysical properties. 
These two problems come together in the case of microphenomenal 
properties. Since microphenomenal properties are phenomenal, we cannot 
investigate them without using first-personal methods. But since microphenomenal 
properties are microscopic, we cannot investigate them using our basic 
 27 
observational capacities. What we need in order to investigate microphenomenal 
properties are first-personal methods that transcend our basic introspective 
capacities. 
Could we develop better experimental methods for investigating 
experience? For example, we might better develop the method of phenomenal 
contrast, where two minimally different experiences are contrasted to isolate a 
particular phenomenal property.26 Or we might examine more dissociation cases, 
such as pain asymbolia, where two phenomenal properties that we thought were 
inextricably connected come apart. Or we might conduct data analyses on 
introspective judgments that aim to extract independent dimensions of variation 
from a set of data. Perhaps these kinds of methods might provide us with indirect 
knowledge of microphenomenal properties, even if we do not grasp those properties 
directly through introspection. But all of the above methods are already used for 
investigating experience, and it’s not obvious that better application of those 
methods would yield knowledge of microphenomenal properties. 
Another possibility is to develop novel experimental methods that are 
substantially better for investigating experience than those we use now. It is likely 
that developing new breakthroughs in experimental methods would require us to 
first advance our general understanding of the structure of experience, just as 
developing better experimental methods for investigating the physical world often 
depended upon more refined understandings of physical phenomena. If this is right, 
then developing methods for investigating the microstructure of experience may 
require us to first get a better understanding of its macrostructure. 
What about our prospects for developing technology to enhance 
investigation of experience? The development of technology that enhances our 
investigation of the physical world has played a crucial role in our understanding 
of the microphysical realm. Perhaps to thoroughly investigate the microstructure 
of experience, we need to develop first-person technology that enhances first-person 
investigation of experiences. For example, perhaps subjects might acquire better 
                                         
26 See Siegel [2011] for a discussion and defense of the method of phenomenal contrast. 
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introspective capacities with advanced training, or specially designed drugs, or 
artificial alterations to their cognitive architectures. If first-person technology could 
be developed, we might be able to investigate the structure of experience. 
The prospect of developing first-person technology raises a number of issues. 
There are epistemological issues, such as how we would know that we are altering 
a subject's introspective capacities rather than the phenomenal character of the 
subject’s experience or the subject’s dispositions to make reports about their own 
experiences. To gain traction on that issue, we need to better understand the nature 
and mechanisms of introspection. And there are communicational issues, such as 
how first-personal data about microphenomenal properties might be stored in a 
format accessible to subjects besides the one undergoing the experience. To gain 
traction on that issue, we need to develop reliable ways of translating first-personal 
data into formats that are third-personally accessible. 
Nevertheless, I believe there are good prospects for developing first-person 
technology. In other work, I argue that it is possible to develop technology for the 
scientific investigation of experience. In particular, I believe that technology could 
enhance our ability to control the parameter’s a subject’s experiences and enhance 
a subject’s introspective capacities.27 This still leaves open whether such technology 
would enable us to empirically confirm or disconfirm MICROSTRUCTURE. But while 
the methodological issues are challenging, I am cautiously optimistic. 
 
CONCEPTS 
In addition to the issues concerning the discovery of microphenomenal 
properties, there are also issues concerning our ability to form concepts for 
microphenomenal properties. 
It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of phenomenal concepts.28 Pure 
phenomenal concepts are concepts that pick out phenomenal properties directly via 
their phenomenal character. When I think about what it is like to have a 
                                         
27 Blinded for review. 
28 See Chalmers [2003] for a more extended discussion of phenomenal concepts. 
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phenomenal red experience, for example, I am employing a pure phenomenal 
concept. Impure phenomenal concepts are concepts that pick out phenomenal 
properties via definite description or linguistic deference. When I think about the 
fact that phenomenal redness is the property typically instantiated in humans when 
they see red objects, I am employing an impure phenomenal concept. Before Mary 
leaves her black and white room,29 she has rich impure phenomenal concepts of 
phenomenal redness but no pure phenomenal concept of phenomenal redness. 
What are the prospects for acquiring pure microphenomenal concepts? It’s 
plausible that acquiring a pure phenomenal concept of a phenomenal property 
requires being able to introspect that property.30 A congenitally blind person 
cannot acquire a pure phenomenal concept of phenomenal redness since they do 
not have visual experiences that they can introspect. I cannot acquire a pure 
phenomenal concept of the proprioceptive experiences of an octopus since I do not 
have octopus experiences that I can introspect. And it is hard to see how normal 
humans could acquire pure microphenomenal concepts at all given that normal 
humans cannot introspect microphenomenal properties. 
Consequently, our prospects for acquiring pure microphenomenal concepts 
may depend upon our prospects for enhancing our introspective capacities.31 The 
problem is that it is unclear whether it is at all possible to enhance introspection. 
                                         
29 This is in reference to Jackson [1982]. 
30 Perhaps another way of forming a pure phenomenal concept of a phenomenal property 
is to extrapolate from other pure phenomenal concepts of similar phenomenal properties. 
Even if I have never had an experience as of a specific shade of blue (and so have never 
introspectively discerned that phenomenal property), perhaps I can still form a pure 
phenomenal concept of that phenomenal property by extrapolating from the phenomenal 
blue experiences I have had. But even if this is right, it is implausible that one can 
extrapolate from pure macrophenomenal concepts to pure microphenomenal concepts. 
31 It is worth remembering, though, that we already have reasons independent of 
MICROSTRUCTURE to think that there are plenty of pure phenomenal concepts that are out 
of reach for us. For example, normal humans cannot acquire pure phenomenal concepts for 
certain bat experiences, octopus experiences, and other exotic experiences. 
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This is in part because there is no sense organ for introspection. In the case of 
perception, we can get a grip on how to enhance our perceptual capacities by 
examining the functional properties of our sense organs. But in the case of 
introspection, there is no obvious way of identifying its mechanisms. Even aside 
from that point the mechanisms of introspection are not well understood. As it 
stands, it is an open question whether it would be possible to enhance our 
introspective capacities.32 
What about impure microphenomenal concepts? Even if Mary cannot 
acquire a pure concept of phenomenal redness, she can still acquire rich impure 
concepts of phenomenal redness. Similarly, even if many pure microphenomenal 
concepts are out of reach, perhaps we could still acquire impure microphenomenal 
concepts. However, these cases might be disanalogous. Mary’s impure concept of 
phenomenal redness is substantive because she has substantive theoretical 
knowledge about phenomenal redness. But our epistemic position with respect to 
microphenomenal properties is quite different from Mary’s epistemic position with 
respect to phenomenal colors. Mary does not know the phenomenal character of 
phenomenal redness, but she knows many other facts about phenomenal redness. 
In contrast, we lack both knowledge of the phenomenal character and theoretical 
knowledge of microphenomenal properties. For example, we do not know what 
theoretical roles particular microphenomenal properties play, beyond that of 
grounding macrophenomenal properties. 
If we could attain more theoretical knowledge about microphenomenal 
properties, then we might be able to acquire more substantive impure 
microphenomenal concepts. But that requires us to address the major 
methodological challenges discussed previously. The methodological issues and the 
conceptual issues intertwine—how substantive our concepts of microphenomenal 
properties could be may depend upon the extent to which we can surmount the 
methodological challenges. 
                                         
32 For more discussion of introspection and its mechanisms, see Schwitzgebel [2014]. 
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The upshot is that investigating the microphenomenal realm requires 
addressing these methodological and conceptual challenges. But while they may be 
formidable, it is worth remembering that we are at early stages for investigating the 
structure of experience. Our epistemic position with respect to the structure of 
experience is like the epistemic position of theorists of antiquity with respect to the 
structure of the physical world. Perhaps just as theorists of antiquity were not in a 
position to appreciate the tools and methods we have developed for investigating the 
physical world, we are not in a position to appreciate the tools and methods that 
could be developed for investigating experience. Perhaps in the future ingenious new 
ways of investigating experience will be devised, and we shall explore the depths of 
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